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Recent work in accounting suggests managerial optimism can lead managers to 
escalate income-increasing earnings management. In this paper, I examine how a 
fundamental attribute of the earnings management setting – the amount of time 
between the earnings management decision and the future reversal – serves as one 
potential source of managerial optimism. I conduct two experiments to test whether 
the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal 
systematically induces optimism and increases participants’ propensity to engage in 
behavior that is analogous to accruals-based and real earnings management, holding 
constant incentives, innate optimism, agency frictions, and the information 
environment. My results indicate that the time between the earnings management 
decision and the future reversal could increase both forms of earnings management by 
leading managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current-period 
earnings management through strong future performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Earnings management that increases earnings in the current period often does 
so at the expense of future earnings (hereafter, “the reversal”).1 Since managers’ 
welfare is affected by their ability to meet both current and future earnings targets, 
their beliefs about future performance become an important factor in the current-
period earnings management decision. Recent research supports this idea, suggesting 
that optimism about future performance can lead managers to manage earnings because 
they overestimate their ability to compensate for current-period earnings management 
through strong future performance (Schrand and Zechman 2012). 
Much of the prior research on the effects of optimistic beliefs on earnings 
management and other management decisions has treated optimism as a personal trait 
(e.g., Hales, Wang, and Williamson 2012; Hribar and Yang 2011; Malmendier and 
Tate 2005; Schrand and Zechman 2012), but environmental factors also can affect 
managerial optimism (e.g., Libby and Rennekamp 2011; Hales and Kachelmeier 
2008). In this paper, I suggest that an important attribute of the earnings management 
setting contributes to optimism-induced earnings management. Specifically, I examine 
(1) whether the amount of time between the current period and the period when the 
reversal occurs systematically increases managers’ optimism about future performance 
compared to current performance (hereafter “horizon-induced optimism") and (2) 
                                                 
1
 I use the term “reversal” to refer to the effect of both accruals management and real earnings 
management on future earnings. While real earnings management does not reverse mechanically like 
accruals management, the sign of the effect on future earnings will typically be opposite of the sign of 
the effect on current earnings. 
 2 
whether horizon-induced optimism increases the likelihood that managers engage in 
income-increasing earnings management. This causal chain is depicted in Figure 1. I 
conduct two experiments that hold constant participants’ incentives, participants’ 
innate optimism, and the information environment, and address these questions in two 
settings that are analogous to accruals-based and real earnings management. 
Figure 1. Hypothesized causal relations. 
 
Understanding how the time between the current period and the reversal period 
might lead managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current-period 
earnings management through strong future performance is important because 
earnings management is costly and the potential benefits are often short-lived (e.g., 
Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis 2009; Myers, Myers, and Skinner 2007; Teoh, 
Wong and Rao 1998). In addition, unlike managerial optimism that results from 
managers’ innate characteristics, optimism that varies systematically with 
environmental factors is unlikely to be successfully mitigated by screening managers 
based on their innate optimism. Understanding how fundamental attributes of 
accounting settings affect optimism is an important first step to identifying effective 
interventions to reduce these effects (e.g., Kadous, Krische, and Sedor 2006). 
The ability of horizon-induced optimism to produce the effects outlined in 
Figure 1 is open to question for two reasons. First, prior tests of horizon-induced 
H1 (+) 
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 3 
optimism in the psychology literature typically involve manipulating the temporal 
distance to a future event in a single-period environment, but earnings management 
decisions are made after receiving feedback about pre-managed performance in the 
current period. Prior research suggests that this feedback might reduce horizon-
induced optimism (Shepperd, Oullette, and Fernandez 1996). Second, most prior 
studies on horizon-induced optimism focus on individuals’ stated beliefs rather than 
on the actions they take as a result of those beliefs. Prior work provides evidence of a 
disconnect between beliefs and actions (see, e.g., Seybert and Bloomfield 2009). It is 
quite possible that the process of making formal forecasts and taking actions to shift 
reported performance between periods might be sufficient for participants to 
reconsider their biased judgments. 
I examine the effect of the time between the current period and the reversal 
period in settings similar to accruals management and real earnings management. I test 
whether horizon-induced optimism affects both types of earnings management 
because there are key differences between accruals management and real earnings 
management that might affect the generalizability of the effect. For example, many 
types of accruals management (e.g., overestimating percentage-of-completion, 
underestimating bad debts, etc.) involve borrowing earnings from a future period to 
increase earnings in the current period, which decreases earnings by the same amount 
when the accruals reverse. In contrast, many types of real earnings management (e.g., 
delaying the start of a project, cutting advertising or R&D, etc.) increase earnings in 
the current period but create a more challenging future environment that makes it more 
difficult to meet performance targets in future periods. Here, the amount and timing of 
 4 
the future reversal is known with less precision for real earnings management than it is 
with accruals management. This uncertainty could affect whether or how horizon-
induced optimism influences earnings management behavior. 
To operationalize the accruals management setting, participants in Experiment 
1 are paid to perform an abstract task during two periods. Following their participation 
in Period 1, participants receive their score, forecast their score for Period 2, and 
choose between two options designed to capture the features of accruals management. 
Participants who choose the “accruals management” option borrow correct responses 
from Period 2 to enhance their Period 1 score and qualify for a Period 1 bonus. 
Because their Period 2 score is reduced by the borrowed amount, this choice increases 
the level of performance required to meet a performance target in Period 2 and makes 
it more difficult to earn a Period 2 bonus. Participants who choose the “no accruals 
management” option do not borrow correct responses from Period 2 and therefore 
receive whatever bonuses their Period 1 and Period 2 performance qualifies them to 
receive.  
Experiment 2 modifies the earnings management decision to capture important 
features of real earnings management. Participants who choose the “real earnings 
management” option qualify for a Period 1 bonus by accepting a more challenging 
task environment in Period 2 that makes it more difficult to earn a Period 2 bonus. 
Participants who choose the “no real earnings management” option do not face a more 
challenging task environment in Period 2 and therefore receive whatever bonuses their 
Period 1 and Period 2 performance qualifies them to receive. 
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In both experiments, I manipulate between participants the amount of time 
between the current period (when the earnings management decision is made) and the 
reversal period by varying whether Period 2 occurs the following month or 
immediately. I find that participants who expect to complete Period 2 the following 
month are more optimistic about their Period 2 performance. The resulting optimism 
increases participants’ willingness to borrow against their Period 2 performance 
(Experiment 1) and increases participants’ willingness to accept a more challenging 
task environment in Period 2 (Experiment 2) in order to qualify for a Period 1 bonus. 
Mediation analyses indicate that this optimism fully accounts for the effect of the 
timing manipulation on participants’ earnings management decisions. These results 
are consistent with horizon-induced optimism increasing both accruals management 
and real earnings management. 
My experimental design allows me to rule out several alternative explanations 
for my results. For example, delaying Period 2 until the following month does not 
actually improve participants’ performance in Period 2 and actually reduces 
participants’ performance-based pay even though the incentive structures are identical. 
Further, the results are not driven by participants’ beliefs that the intervening month 
will help them to realize better outcomes. My experiment also isolates the effect of the 
timing manipulation through beliefs about future performance by holding constant the 
timing of the payoffs for periods 1 and 2 across conditions, and my results cannot be 
explained by wishful betting or by rational or irrational discounting of payoffs that 
directly affect participants’ preferences (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue 2002). 
 6 
My study also capitalizes on the comparative advantages of experiments 
(Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). For example, my experimental approach 
allows me to capture more direct measures of optimism instead of inferring optimism 
from management forecasts, press statements, or operational decisions, allowing me to 
test how horizon-induced optimism affects earnings management decisions while 
controlling for innate optimism and strategic considerations that are normally 
confounded in these proxies for managers’ private beliefs. My abstract experiments 
also allow me to create a control group to test my hypotheses while holding constant 
incentives, individual characteristics, and the information environment. Identifying an 
appropriate control group in archival datasets or with a less abstract experimental 
setting would be difficult because there is always a significant amount of time between 
the current period and the reversal period in practice.
2
 
My findings suggest that horizon-induced optimism could affect earnings 
management decisions in at least three ways. First, horizon-induced optimism might 
influence the overall level of earnings management observed in practice by 
systematically increasing managers’ propensity to engage in earnings management 
that reverses in future periods. Second, the amount of time between the earnings 
management decision and the reversal will vary across earnings management 
techniques, and horizon-induced optimism should increase managers’ willingness to 
engage in earnings management more as the amount of time increases. Finally, 
                                                 
2
 One possibility might be to exploit variation in the amount of time between the earnings management 
decision and future reversal across regulatory regimes (e.g., quarterly vs. semi-annual) or across 
earnings management techniques. However, exploiting this variation to test my hypotheses would be 
difficult because differences in regulatory regimes, managers’ information set, and managers’ strategic 
reporting incentives would be confounded with the length of the time delay. In addition, any control 
group would have a time delay of at least one reporting period, resulting in a weaker test of the effect of 
horizon-induced optimism on earnings management. 
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horizon-induced optimism could lead managers to issue more optimistic long-horizon 
forecasts, thereby increasing market expectations and pressure to engage in earnings 
management in future periods. 
These findings have potentially important implications for market participants 
and regulators. While managers who strategically engage in earnings management 
might benefit themselves or current shareholders (Bhojraj and Libby 2005), earnings 
management resulting from non-conscious processes such as horizon-induced 
optimism is more likely to have adverse consequences. For example, when firms fall 
short of market expectations in the current period, horizon-induced optimism could 
lead managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management because they 
overestimate their ability to compensate for current-period earnings management 
through strong future performance. Thus, horizon-induced optimism could start 
managers down a “slippery slope” where relatively benign earnings management 
escalates over time (e.g., Brown et al. 2011; Brown 2012; Schrand and Zechman 
2012).
3
 Understanding how environmental factors might contribute to that optimism is 
an important first step to identifying effective interventions. 
While experiments are not well-suited to estimating effect magnitudes in the 
real world, there are at least two reasons that the sign of my results is likely to 
generalize to the earnings management setting of interest. First, horizon-induced 
optimism is a fundamental psychological phenomenon, such that managers at various 
levels throughout organizations should be susceptible to these same errors. Second, 
                                                 
3
 The Phar-Mor fraud provides an anecdotal example of this type of pattern. Pat Finn, the former CFO, 
indicates that the fraud began with an initial misstatement and that “given time” they’d be able to “fix 
the problem.” Even as the fraud ballooned, Finn states that he “always had a belief [they] could fix it” 
(see Frontline 1994). 
 8 
optimism is a primary facet of overconfidence (Skala 2008), and growing literatures in 
accounting and finance suggest that overconfidence affects a variety of managerial 
decisions (e.g., Hribar and Yang 2011; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Schrand and 
Zechman 2012), suggesting that optimism appears to be robust to the strong incentives 
and institutional forces present in these settings. 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide 
background information and develop my hypotheses. I discuss the methods and results 
for Experiment 1 in Chapter 3 and the methods and results for Experiment 2 in 
Chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides additional discussion and analyses, and Chapter 6 
provides concluding remarks.
 9 
CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
Managers regularly make operational and accounting decisions that affect 
reported performance in future periods, and there always is a timing difference 
between the current period and future periods in any periodic reporting setting. In this 
section, I develop hypotheses about how that timing difference affects beliefs about 
future performance and about potential implications for managers’ disclosure and 
reporting decisions. 
2.1 The Optimism Bias 
 People’s expectations about the future are often unrealistically optimistic (see, 
e.g., Weinstein 1980). Evidence suggests that this “optimism bias” is a pervasive 
phenomenon, with approximately 80% of people expecting the future to be better than 
it ends up being (Sharot, Korn, and Dolan 2011; Sharot 2011; Strunk, Lopez, and 
DeRubeis 2006). Although the future may fall short of optimists’ expectations, the 
optimism bias is probably functional most of the time (for a review, see Carver, 
Scheier, and Segerstrom 2010), as optimism is positively associated with health and 
longevity (Tindle et al. 2009), relationship quality (Assad, Donnellan, and Conger 
(2007), successful goal pursuit (Carver and Scheier 2001), and career achievement 
(Segerstrom 2007; Solberg Nes, Evans, and Segerstrom 2009). 
 Most theories of learning would suggest that the optimism bias shouldn’t 
persist, as people should update their beliefs upon receiving new information (e.g., 
Pearce and Hall 1980; Sutton and Barto 1998). Yet, research finds that the optimism 
 10 
bias is common among people of all ages (Sharot 2011) and across levels of expertise 
(e.g., Baker and Emery 1993; Calderon 1993; Larwood and Whittaker 1977), 
suggesting the bias persists despite ample learning opportunities. Recent work in 
neuroscience indicates that the bias persists at least in part because human physiology 
favors optimism (e.g., Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, and Phelps 2007), perhaps due to its 
many apparent benefits. The evidence indicates that people asymmetrically update 
their beliefs more for favorable than unfavorable information about the future, and this 
asymmetric updating is correlated with independent measures of individuals’ 
optimism. Further, disrupting the function of the brain region associated with coding 
favorable estimation errors attenuates the optimism bias whereas disrupting the 
function of the brain region associated with coding unfavorable estimation errors 
exacerbates the optimism bias.
4
 
2.2 The Effect of Time 
 The above discussion highlights that people tend to be optimistic about the 
future. Several studies also indicate that people tend to be more optimistic about 
events that will occur in the more distant future than events that will occur in the near 
future. For example, the temporal distance to future events can change how 
individuals process information (e.g., Trope and Liberman 2003, 2010; White 2013), 
such that people considering the distant future underweight factors that might prevent 
positive outcomes (Nussbaum, Liberman, and Trope 2006), perceive future tasks as 
                                                 
4
 Specifically, Sharot et al. (2011) and Sharot et al. (2012) find that the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 
seems to track and integrate information into prior beliefs, with the left IFG tracking favorable 
estimation errors and the right IFG tracking unfavorable estimation errors. They find that lower activity 
in the right IFG predicts reduced belief-updating in response to unfavorable information about the 
future. 
 11 
being less difficult (Tsai and Thomas 2011), and focus on reasons they will succeed 
than reasons they might fail (Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 1994; Eyal, Liberman, Trope, 
and Walther 2004; Gilovich, Kerr, and Medvec 1993; Weinstein 1980). Affective 
processes also appear to contribute to this phenomenon, as emotions serve as one cue 
to optimism. Because people tend to experience less anxiety when future events are 
temporally distant, people feel more optimistic when considering the distant future 
(Sweeny, Carroll, and Shepperd 2006). Finally, motivational factors also appear to 
play a role, as individuals might feel less accountable and have greater latitude to 
adopt more favorable beliefs when self-relevant feedback is temporally distant (Kunda 
1990; Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Shepperd et al. 1996). While cognitive, affective, and 
motivational factors all appear to contribute to this phenomenon, central to this study 
is that people are generally more optimistic when considering the distant future than 
when considering the near future. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The amount of time between the current period and a future 
period increases managers’ optimism about future performance. 
2.3 Earnings Management 
Prior work in accounting suggests that optimism increases managers’ 
propensity to issue optimistic forecasts (Hribar and Yang 2011; Libby and 
Rennekamp 2012). One potential implication of H1 is that horizon-induced 
optimism could lead managers to set unrealistically optimistic market 
expectations that increase earnings management pressure in future periods 
(Kasznik 1999; Tan, Libby and Hunton 2002). However, horizon-induced 
optimism could also increase earnings management in the current period. 
Specifically, holding constant the magnitude of a current-period earnings 
 12 
shortfall, horizon-induced optimism should make managers more optimistic 
that they can meet future earnings targets even if they engage in income-
increasing earnings management in the current period (Schrand and Zechman 
2012). 
One technique managers might use to increase current-period earnings is 
accruals management. Many types of income-increasing accruals management (e.g., 
overestimating percentage-of-completion, underestimating bad debts, etc.) involve 
borrowing earnings from future periods in order to increase income in the current 
period (Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley 2003). Because these accruals reverse in 
subsequent periods, reported earnings in the future will be reduced by the same 
amount. If the amount of time between the current period and the reversal period 
increases managers’ optimism about future performance, this horizon-induced 
optimism should increase managers’ willingness to engage in accruals management 
because they believe they can borrow earnings from future periods and still 
successfully meet future earnings targets. 
H2a: Horizon-induced optimism increases managers’ propensity to 
engage in accruals-based earnings management. 
An alternative technique managers might use to increase current-period 
earnings is real earnings management. Many types of real earnings management 
involve taking real economic actions (e.g., cutting discretionary spending or delaying 
the initiation of a new project) that increase earnings in the current period but also 
destroy firm value (Bhojraj and Libby 2005; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006) so that meeting future earnings targets requires managers to post 
strong performance in a more challenging future operating environment. 
 13 
While horizon-induced optimism might increase managers’ willingness to 
engage in real earnings management, finding support for H2a does not necessarily 
imply that this relation will also hold for real earnings management. In contrast to 
accruals management, the effect of real earnings management on future earnings is 
somewhat uncertain,
5
 and this increased uncertainty could affect whether or how 
horizon-induced optimism affects real earnings management decisions. For example, 
the additional uncertainty could lead managers to reconsider and correct biased beliefs 
or prevent managers from acting on horizon-induced optimism in a real earnings 
management setting. Given these possibilities and the prevalence of real earnings 
management in practice (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008; Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006), it is important to test whether horizon-induced optimism also 
affects real-earnings management. 
H2b: Horizon-induced optimism increases managers’ propensity to 
engage in real earnings management.
                                                 
5
 For example, if managers intentionally overstate inventory by a certain amount, the reversal in the 
next period will be for the same amount. In contrast, there is more uncertainty about how cutting 
advertising might affect future earnings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EXPERIMENT 1  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Design. Experiment 1 examines the effect of horizon-induced optimism on behavior 
that is analogous to accruals-based earnings management. As discussed previously, identifying 
an appropriate control group in archival data would be difficult because there is always a timing 
difference between the current period and future periods in a financial reporting environment. In 
addition, managers’ information set and strategic reporting incentives would be confounded with 
the amount of time between the current period and a future period. I use an abstract task that 
allows me to test my hypotheses while capturing key aspects of the financial reporting 
environment. In the experiment, participants answer 25 trivia questions in each of two 
performance periods.
6
 As in a normal business setting, strong performance requires knowledge 
and effort, and higher performance on the task increases compensation. In addition, the task has 
clear performance metrics, involves multiple performance periods, and provides participants with 
performance feedback after Period 1 that they can use when considering whether to manage 
reported performance. I manipulate the amount of time between Period 1 and Period 2 in a 1 x 2 
between-participant design. In the No Delay condition, participants expect to complete Period 2 
“in just a few minutes.” In the Delay condition, participants expect to complete Period 2 “next 
month.” This design allows me to manipulate the amount of time to Period 2 while holding all 
other task information and incentives constant across conditions. 
                                                 
6
 My task is adapted from Libby and Rennekamp (2012). My Period 1 and Period 2 trivia questions correspond to 
their first- and second-round questions for participants in the “low-difficulty” condition. After compiling a bank of 
180 trivia questions from the board game Trivial Pursuit (Hasbro 2008), Libby and Rennekamp (2012) used four 
independent raters to classify questions as “easy,” “medium,” or “hard.” The raters were able to look at all trivia 
questions simultaneously. Questions were randomly selected from the set of questions where the majority of raters 
were able to agree on the level of difficulty. 
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3.1.2 Participants. Following Rennekamp (2012), I recruit 202 participants through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) is an internet 
crowdsourcing marketplace that allows “requesters” to pay “workers” to perform various tasks. 
AMT is becoming an increasingly popular source for recruiting participants in academic research 
studies because the participant pool is large, readily accessible, and at least as representative of 
the U.S. population as traditional participant pools (for a review, see Mason and Suri 2012). In 
order to receive compensation for completing tasks, workers must have their work approved by 
requesters, which provides a review and rating system that incentivizes Workers to pay careful 
attention to the tasks.
7
 As will be explained in more detail below, my study is carried out over 
two sessions. Most participants complete the first session in about 8 minutes and the second 
session in about 6 minutes.
8
 Participants are paid $1 for participating in each session of the study 
and receive an average performance bonus of $0.59 if they participate in both sessions. 68.3% of 
participants participate in both sessions, for an effective hourly rate of about $11.10. The 
remaining 31.7% of participants participate in only Session 1 for an effective hourly rate of about 
$7.50.
9
 These rates are well above the median wage for most tasks on AMT (Horton and Chilton 
2010). 
                                                 
7
 To prevent Workers from having multiple accounts, AMT requires U.S. based workers to provide their social 
security number or individual tax identification number AMT. In addition, AMT prevents Workers from 
participating multiple times on the same task, and Qualtrics (which I use to distribute my survey) uses cookies to 
prevent participants from participating multiple times in the same study. Despite these precautions, 6 participants 
have the same IP address as participants from pilot testing. Because these participants may or may not be the same 
individuals who participated in my pilot study, I do not exclude them from analyses. They are randomly assigned 
across conditions, and inferences are unchanged when I exclude these participants. 
8
 Start times and end times were tracked to the nearest minute. These times reflect the median difference between 
start and end times. 
9
 As described in more detail below, I alleviate self-selection concerns in two ways. First, my primary analyses are 
based on the full sample of participants using only measures collected during the first experimental session. Second, 
the second experimental session takes place the following month for all participants, regardless of experimental 
condition. This design choice reduces the likelihood that my supplemental analyses are driven by self-selection, as 
any self-selection effect would have to vary across conditions to explain my results. 
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Libby et al. (2002) suggest that participant selection should be driven by the demands and 
goals of the experiment. I restrict my sample to Workers within the United States who have an 
approval rate of at least 95%, because my task requires participants to be able to read and 
understand English and pay careful attention to the task, but otherwise does not require any 
particular expertise. On average, participants are 31.7 years old and have 10.7 years of full-time 
work experience. 48.3% are female and 96% report being native English speakers.
10
 Given that 
the literature suggests that optimism is both pervasive and fundamental to human cognition, the 
sign of my results would be unlikely to differ if I had instead recruited experienced financial 
managers as participants. 
3.1.3 Procedures. Figure 2 provides a depiction of the experimental timeline. All 
participants are informed that the study will involve two separate sessions, with the second 
session taking place the following month. Participants are informed that they will earn $1 for 
each session and that by participating in both sessions, they will also be eligible for additional 
performance-based bonuses.
11
 After agreeing to participate in both sessions of the study, 
participants are provided additional information about the task. Specifically, they are told they 
will answer 25 trivia questions consisting of 15 easy, 5 medium and 5 hard questions, earn a 
$0.01 performance bonus for each correct response, and have four minutes to answer these 
questions. All participants then complete Period 1 and receive feedback indicating the number of 
questions they answered correctly. 
  
                                                 
10
 Inferences are unchanged when I exclude participants who report they are not native English speakers. 
11
 The performance bonus could not be calculated for participants in the Delay condition until after the second 
experimental session. Performance bonuses were paid only after all participants completed both parts of the study in 
order to avoid a between-condition timing difference of when participants received their performance bonus, which 
would introduce a discount-rate confound in the earnings management decision. 
 17 
Figure 2. Experimental Procedures 
  
Period 1 
Feedback (Score) 
Random Assignment to Time Delay 
Condition 
Optimism Measures 
Earnings Management Decision 
Supplemental Questions 
Period 2 (No Time Delay Condition) 
Demographic Questions 
Fixed Payment for Participating in 
Session 1 
Period 2 (Time Delay Condition) 
Filler Task 
Fixed Payment for Participating in 
Session 2 
Performance-based Bonuses Awarded 
Session 1 Session 2 
(One Month Delay) 
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 Participants are randomly assigned to one of two time delay conditions (TIME 
DELAY). Participants in the No Delay (Delay) condition are told they will answer an 
additional set of 25 trivia questions “in just a few minutes” (“next month”) and that 
these questions will again consist of 15 easy, 5 medium and 5 hard questions. They are 
also informed they will earn a $0.01 bonus for each correct response and will have 
only two minutes to answer these questions. Reducing the time limit from four to two 
minutes for Period 2 reduces the likelihood that participants’ Period 2 forecasts are 
identical to their Period 1 performance while also ensuring that participants cannot 
simply use the internet to attain high performance in Period 2. 
3.1.4 Dependent Measures. I collect two measures intended to capture 
participants’ optimism. First, participants indicate how confident they are that they 
will perform at least as well on the second set of trivia questions as they did on the 
first set of trivia questions (CONFIDENCE, 11-point scale, where 1 = “Not at all 
confident” and 11 = “Very confident”).12 Next, participants provide an explicit 
forecast of the number of questions they expect to answer correctly on the second set 
of trivia questions (between 0 and 25).
13
 I use this forecast to construct a measure of 
                                                 
12
 Overconfidence can refer to overplacement of the mean (i.e., optimism) or to confidence intervals 
that are too narrow (i.e., “miscalibration;” see, e.g., Skala 2008). While my measure of confidence 
could refer to either facet of overconfidence, it appears to primarily capture optimism. Specifically, in 
pilot testing I elicited participants’ estimates of the minimum and maximum number of questions they 
would correctly answer in Period 2. I found that confidence ratings were strongly positively associated 
with participants’ estimates of both the minimum and maximum, but not with the width of the range. In 
addition, my time delay manipulation increased estimates of both the minimum and maximum, but did 
not affect the width of the range, providing evidence that the time delay affects optimism but not 
miscalibration. I omitted this measure of miscalibration from my two reported experiments because the 
construct it captured was clearly not distinct from participants’ point estimates. 
13
 Participants are instructed that their “estimate should be as accurate as possible” and that more 
accurate estimates will result in a larger performance bonus. Participants are awarded a bonus based on 
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participants’ forecast optimism (FORECAST OPTIMISM) by subtracting participants’ 
Period 2 target from their forecast for Period 2.
14
 
Participants also respond to a question designed to capture important features 
of income-increasing accruals management (see Panel A of the Appendix). 
Specifically, after forecasting their Period 2 scores, participants are told they can earn 
a $0.50 performance bonus in Period 2 if they meet a performance target set equal to 
each participant’s Period 1 score minus three. Pilot testing indicated that 
approximately half of the participants would meet or beat this target, which is set 
below their Period 1 score as a result of the reduced time limit in Period 2. Participants 
can choose whether to “borrow 4 correct responses” from their Period 2 performance 
to enhance their Period 1 score and earn a $0.50 Period 1 bonus (EM DECISION). 
However, because the effect of borrowing reverses in Period 2, the Period 2 
performance target increases by the borrowed amount, so participants who choose this 
option face a higher Period 2 target set equal to each participant’s Period 1 score plus 
one.
15
 Participants are told they must meet or beat this higher Period 2 target in order 
to keep the Period 1 bonus and earn the Period 2 bonus. This design choice serves two 
functions. First, empirical evidence suggests that any stock price premium obtained 
through earnings management – one of the primary motivations for managing earnings 
(Graham et al. 2005) – dissipates immediately upon missing future benchmarks 
(Barth, Elliott, and Finn 1999; Myers et al. 2007). Consistent with this empirical 
                                                                                                                                            
the following formula: Bonus = $0.15 - .01*|Estimate – Actual|. |Estimate – Actual| is less than 15 for 
all participants. 
14
 Using this ex ante measure of forecast optimism alleviates self-selection concerns. I examine ex post 
optimism (forecasted Period 2 performance – actual Period 2 Performance) in supplemental analyses. 
15
 Thus, my design effectively holds constant the magnitude of the performance shortfall in Period 1, as 
all participants can earn a Period 1 bonus by borrowing four correct responses from their Period 2 
performance. 
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evidence, participants in my study can realize benefits by managing earnings, but 
these benefits are maintained only if the performance target is met in Period 2. 
Second, this design choice is critical from a methodological perspective. If participants 
were to keep the Period 1 bonus regardless of the level of Period 2 performance, 
managing earnings would be costless and all participants would choose to engage in 
accruals management. 
3.1.5 Additional Measures and Procedures. Following the earnings 
management decision, participants indicate how they expect the reduced time limit to 
affect their performance in Period 2. Participants respond on an 11-point scale with 
endpoints, -5 = “I will perform much WORSE than I would with more time” to 5 = “I 
will perform much BETTER than I would with more time.” Participants then indicate 
whether they believe they would perform worse, the same, or better if they were to 
complete Period 2 in the alternative time delay condition. That is, participants in the 
No Delay (Delay) condition indicate whether they would perform worse, the same, or 
better if they were to instead complete Period 2 “next month” (“just a few minutes 
from now”). Participants in the No Delay condition then answer the second set of 25 
trivia questions and provide a revised rating of how the reduced time limit affected 
their performance on the second set of questions. All participants conclude the first 
session of the study by answering demographic questions. 
 All participants receive an email the following month inviting them to 
participate in the second session of the study.
16
 By participating in the second session 
of the study, participants receive an additional $1 and become eligible to receive their 
                                                 
16
 Holding constant the timing of the second experimental session across conditions allows me to test 
whether any self-selection effects vary across condition. 
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performance-based bonuses. Participants in the No Delay condition complete a filler 
task consisting of a pilot test for an unrelated study. Participants in the Delay 
condition complete the second set of 25 trivia questions, provide a revised rating of 
how the reduced time limit affected their performance on the second set of questions, 
and complete the filler task. I then calculate and pay performance bonuses to all 
participants who participate in both parts of the study. 
3.2 Results 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and univariate analyses for participants’ 
Period 1 scores, confidence in their Period 2 performance, forecasts of their Period 2 
score, accruals management decisions, and actual Period 2 scores. 
3.2.1 Tests of Hypotheses. My first hypothesis predicts that a time delay 
between Period 1 and Period 2 will increase participants’ optimism. I test this 
hypothesis using CONFIDENCE and FORECAST OPTIMISM as proxies for optimism 
(see Panel A of Table 2). Consistent with H1, I find that participants in the Delay 
condition are more confident than are participants in the No Delay condition that they 
will perform at least as well in Period 2 as they did in Period 1 (p <0.001, one-sided).
17
 
In addition, I find that participants in the Delay condition issue more optimistic 
forecasts for Period 2 than participants in the No Delay condition (p<0.001, one-
sided). These results strongly suggest that the time delay increases participants’ 
optimism. 
                                                 
17
 Reported results control for participants’ Period 1 score. Inferences are unchanged if I do not control 
for participants’ Period 1 score. 
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TABLE 1 
Experiment 1: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median] 
        
     
  
Full Sample 
 
Participants Who Completed Both Session 1 and 2 
        
     
Variable   Overall   No Delay   Delay  Overall   No Delay   Delay 
       
      
Period 1 Score (out of 25)  
16.624 
 
16.790 = 16.461  17.116  17.197 = 17.042 
 
(4.471) 
 
(4.477) 
 
(4.480)  (3.967)  (4.020)  (3.945) 
 
[18.0] 
 
[18.0] 
 
[18.0]  [18.0]  [18.0]  [18.0] 
       
      
Confidence in Period 2 
Performance relative to 
Period 1
†
 
 
7.455 
 
6.890 < 8.010
***
  7.246  6.773 < 7.681
**
 
 
(2.382) 
 
(2.242) 
 
(2.394)  (2.336)  (2.081)  (2.483) 
 
[8.0] 
 
[7.0] 
 
[8.5]  [7.5]  [7.0]  [8.0] 
       
      
Forecasted Period 2 Score 
(out of 25)
†
 
 
15.752 
 
14.970 < 16.520
***
  15.812  14.970 < 16.583
***
 
 
(4.283) 
 
(4.574) 
 
(3.848)  (4.247)  (4.791)  (3.540) 
 
[16.0] 
 
[15.0] 
 
[17.0]  [16.5]  [15.0]  [17.0] 
       
      
Proportion of Participants 
Engaging in Accruals 
Management
†
 
 
0.426 
 
0.380 < 0.471
*
  0.413  0.333 < 0.486
**
 
       
      
Period 2 Score (out of 25)  
N/A  12.900  N/A  13.000  13.106 = 12.903 
   (3.935)    (3.742)  (3.705)  (3.798) 
   [13.0]    [13.0]  [13.0]  [13.0] 
       
      
  
n = 202 
 
n = 100 
 
n = 102  n = 138  n = 66  n = 72 
This table provides descriptive statistics for various measures captured in Experiment 1, separately presenting variable Means, (Standard Deviations) and 
[Medians] for the No Delay and Delay conditions. 
Significance levels are indicated by ***, **, and * representing significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
†
 One-tailed test. 
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TABLE 2 
Experiment 1: Tests of Horizon-Induced Optimism and Implications for Accruals Management 
Panel A: Tests of H1 
     Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on CONFIDENCE         
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
8.157 0.652 12.51 <0.001 
TIME DELAY + 1.095 0.324 3.38 <0.001
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE   -0.075 0.036 -2.08 0.039 
      Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on FORECAST OPTIMISM       
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
9.010 0.989 9.11 <0.001 
TIME DELAY + 1.173 0.491 3.51 <0.001 
PERIOD 1 SCORE  -0.466 0.0551 -8.46 <0.001 
 
Panel B: Tests of H2a 
     Test of the effect of CONFIDENCE on EM DECISION       
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Chi 
Square 
p-value 
Intercept 
 
-1.329 0.845 2.47 0.116 
TIME DELAY 
 
0.071 0.311 0.05 0.819 
CONFIDENCE + 0.279 0.073 14.58 <0.001
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE 
 
-0.068 0.035 3.65 0.056 
For log odds of Manage/Don't Manage         
      Test of the effect of FORECAST OPTIMISM on EM DECISION 
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Chi 
Square 
p-value 
Intercept 
 
-0.983 0.765 1.65 0.199 
TIME DELAY 
 
0.039 0.312 0.02 0.901 
FORECAST OPTIMISM + 0.232 0.056 16.97 <0.001
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE  0.008 0.041 0.04 0.848 
For log odds of Manage/Don't Manage         
(continued)  
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Experiment 1: Tests of Horizon-induced Optimism and Implications for Accruals Management 
Tests of Mediation      
Description       
Sobel 
Statistic p-value 
Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION 
through CONFIDENCE   
2.53 0.006
†
 
Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION 
through FORECAST OPTIMISM   
2.67 0.004
†
 
      VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: 
CONFIDENCE = participants' response to the following: "how confident are you that you will 
perform at least as well as you did on the first set of questions?" Response is measured on an 
11-point scale, where 1 = "Not at all Confident" and 11 = "Very Confident" 
EM DECISION = Participants are coded as having managed earnings if they elect to borrow 
correct responses from the second period in an attempt to achieve both a first- and second-
period bonus. 
FORECAST OPTIMISM = Forecast - Period 2 Benchmark. Period 2 Benchmark = Period 1 
Score - 3 
TIME DELAY = 1 if a participant was in the Delay condition and 0 otherwise. 
PERIOD 1 SCORE = Number of correct responses (out of 25) in the first set of 25 trivia 
questions. 
This table summarizes tests of my hypotheses. The variable(s) of interest for hypotheses are indicated 
with directional predictions shown under the "Expectation" heading in each panel. 
†
 One-tailed test. 
 
 H2a predicts that this optimism will increase participants’ propensity to borrow 
correct responses from their future performance in an attempt to earn both a Period 1 
and Period 2 bonus, analogous to engaging in accruals management. To test the effect 
of horizon-induced optimism on participants’ accruals management decisions, I test 
whether CONFIDENCE mediates the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION (e.g., 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). I control for participants’ Period 1 score and 
include TIME DELAY and CONFIDENCE in a logistic regression with EM 
DECISION as the outcome variable. I find that TIME DELAY is not significant (p = 
0.819, two-sided) while CONFIDENCE is highly significant (p < 0.001, one-sided). A 
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Sobel test confirms that CONFIDENCE significantly mediates the effect of TIME 
DELAY on EM DECISION (p = 0.006, one-sided), indicating that TIME DELAY 
affects participants’ EM DECISION through CONFIDENCE (see Panel B of Table 2). 
Inferences are unchanged if I instead use FORECAST OPTIMISM as a proxy for 
participants’ optimism. Specifically, when TIME DELAY and FORECAST OPTIMISM 
are included in a logistic regression with EM DECISION as the outcome variable, I 
find that TIME DELAY is not significant (p = 0.901, two-sided) while FORECAST 
OPTIMISM is highly significant (p <0.001, one-sided). A Sobel test confirms that 
FORECAST OPTIMISM significantly mediates the effect of TIME DELAY on EM 
DECISION (p = 0.004, one-sided). 
 These findings support the theoretical predictions depicted in Figure 1, 
indicating that TIME DELAY affects EM DECISION through horizon-induced 
optimism. My findings suggest that participants exhibit greater optimism when they 
expect to perform Period 2 the following month rather than immediately, even though 
they have exactly the same incentives and information about the upcoming task. This 
horizon-induced optimism increases participants’ propensity to borrow from future 
performance in an attempt to qualify for a Period 1 bonus, analogous to accruals 
management. In addition, the lack of significance of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION 
after controlling for my measures of optimism provides no indication of an 
incremental effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION by directly changing 
participants’ preferences (e.g., due to rational or irrational discounting of future 
payoffs, wishful betting, etc.). 
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3.2.2 Ex Post Optimism. My primary analyses avoid self-selection concerns by 
relying only on measures collected during Session 1 of my experiment. However, this 
requires the assumption that participants in the Delay condition do not actually 
perform better in Period 2 than do participants in the No Delay condition. This 
assumption appears reasonable given that I find no evidence that TIME DELAY affects 
Period 2 scores for participants who participate in both sessions of the study (p = 
0.751, two-sided).
18
 Further, participants in the Delay condition earn lower 
performance-based bonuses than participants in the No Delay condition (p = 0.097, 
one-sided). As an alternative test of my hypotheses, I restrict my sample to 
participants who participated in both Session 1 and Session 2 of my experiment and 
test whether participants in the Delay condition issue more optimistic forecasts 
relative to their actual Period 2 performance (EX POST OPTIMISM) than participants 
in the No Delay condition, where EX POST OPTIMISM is the difference between 
participants’ forecasts and their Period 2 score. I find that participants in the Delay 
condition exhibit more EX POST OPTIMISM (mean = 3.68 questions) than do 
participants in the No Delay condition (mean = 1.86 questions, p = 0.013, one-sided). 
Further, EX POST OPTIMISM significantly predicts participants’ EM DECISION (p < 
0.001, one-sided) and significantly mediates the effect of TIME DELAY on 
participants’ EM DECISION (p = 0.029, one-sided). These results provide additional 
support for my hypotheses, suggesting that horizon-induced optimism increases 
                                                 
18
 I also find no difference if I compare Period 2 scores for participants in the Delay condition who 
completed both sessions to Period 2 scores for all participants in the No Delay condition (p = 0.996, 
two-sided). 
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participants’ propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to accruals-based 
earnings management.
19
 
3.2.3 Plans to Improve during the Intervening Month. One potential 
explanation for my findings is that participants in the Delay condition expect to 
prepare for the Period 2 trivia task in the intervening month. To test this possibility, I 
ask participants to indicate how their performance would be affected by the timing of 
Period 2. 73.8% of participants indicate they would perform the same regardless of 
whether they were to complete Period 2 “just a few minutes from now” or “next 
month,” and this is significantly greater than chance (p<0.001, one-sided). 15.3% of 
participants indicate they would perform better “just a few minutes from now,” 
whereas only 10.9% of participants indicate that they would perform better “next 
month.” Thus, nearly 90% of participants indicate that delaying Period 2 until the 
following month would not improve their expected performance, and inferences are 
unchanged if I base analyses on only these participants. These findings suggest that 
participants do not intentionally exhibit horizon-induced optimism because they 
expect to improve their performance by preparing or practicing for Period 2.
20
                                                 
19
 I find no evidence of self-selection across Time Delay conditions. Participants in the No Delay and 
Delay conditions are equally likely to participate in the second session (p = 0.484, two-sided). While 
participants are more likely to participate in Session 2 when they are more confident (p = 0.086, two-
sided) and have lower Period 1 scores (p = 0.063, two-sided), neither selection effect interacts with 
TIME DELAY (p = 0.431, two-sided and p = 0.870, two-sided, respectively). 
20
 I also find no evidence that TIME DELAY affects participants’ perceptions of the effect of the time 
constraint on their performance (p = 0.894, two-sided). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
EXPERIMENT 2  
Experiment 1 examines how the amount of time between the current period 
and the reversal period affects managers’ accruals management behavior. While 
accruals management and real earnings management both make it more difficult to 
meet future earnings targets, the magnitude of the effect of real earnings management 
on future performance is more uncertain. As discussed previously, finding support for 
H2a does not necessarily imply that horizon-induced optimism will have the same 
effect on real earnings management, because this heightened uncertainty could affect 
whether or how horizon-induced optimism affects real earnings management. In 
Experiment 2, I examine whether horizon-induced optimism affects participants’ 
propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to real earnings management. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Design. I use the same task and design as Experiment 1. I manipulate, in 
a 1 x 2 between-participant design, the time delay between Period 1 and Period 2. As 
in Experiment 1, participants in the No Delay condition expect to complete Period 2 
“in just a few minutes” while participants in the Delay condition expect to complete 
Period 2 “next month.” 
4.1.2 Participants. 206 participants recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk participate in Experiment 2.
21
 Most participants complete the first session in 
                                                 
21
 Despite precautions taken to prevent repeat-participants, 12 participants have the same IP address as 
participants from pilot testing or Experiment 1. Because these participants may or may not be the same 
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about 8 minutes and the second session in about 7 minutes.
22
 Participants are paid $1 
for participating in each session of the study and receive an average performance 
bonus of $0.58 if they participate in both sessions. 67.0% of participants participate in 
both sessions, for an effective hourly rate of about $10.32. The remaining 33.0% of 
participants participate in only Session 1 for an effective hourly rate of about $7.50. 
On average, participants are 32.5 years old and have 11.2 years of full-time work 
experience. 57.3% are female and 99.0% report being native English speakers.
23
 
4.1.3 Procedures. Experiment 2 examines the effect of horizon-induced 
optimism on behavior that is analogous to real earnings management. All procedures 
are identical to Experiment 1, with the following two exceptions. First, instead of 
choosing whether to borrow correct responses from their Period 2 performance to earn 
a Period 1 bonus, participants in Experiment 2 can choose to earn a Period 1 bonus by 
agreeing to trade five easy questions for five medium questions in Period 2, so that 
Period 2 consists of 10 easy questions, 10 medium questions and 5 hard questions 
rather than 15 easy questions, 5 medium questions and 5 hard questions (see Panel B 
of the Appendix). This choice is intended to be analogous to real earnings 
management in that it benefits Period 1 performance by changing the performance 
generating process resulting in a more challenging environment in the future. Second, 
in addition to asking participants to make an earnings management decision, I also ask 
                                                                                                                                            
individuals who participated in my pilot study, I do not exclude them from analyses. They are randomly 
assigned across conditions, and inferences are unchanged when I exclude these participants. 
22
 Start times and end times were tracked to the nearest minute. These times reflect the median 
difference between start and end times. 
23
 Inferences are unchanged when I exclude participants who report they are not native English 
speakers. 
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participants to rate how strongly they prefer the earnings management decision they 
made to the alternative they rejected (PREFERENCE STRENGTH).
24
 
4.2 Results 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and univariate analyses for participants’ 
Period 1 scores, confidence in their Period 2 performance, forecasts of their Period 2 
scores, real earnings management decisions, preference strength for their earnings 
management decision, and actual Period 2 scores. 
4.2.1 Tests of Hypotheses. As in Experiment 1, I find strong evidence 
supporting H1 (see Panel A of Table 4), as TIME DELAY increases participants’ 
CONFIDENCE (p<0.001, one-sided) and FORECAST OPTIMISM (p=0.005, one-
sided), confirming that the time delay increases participants’ optimism about future 
performance. 
H2b predicts that this optimism will increase participants’ propensity to accept 
a more difficult task environment in an attempt to earn both a Period 1 and Period 2 
bonus. I test whether CONFIDENCE mediates the effect of TIME DELAY on EM 
DECISION, controlling for participants’ Period 1 score (see Panel B of Table 4).25 
When both TIME DELAY and CONFIDENCE are included in a logistic regression 
with EM DECISION as the outcome variable, TIME DELAY is not significant 
(p=0.651, two-sided) while CONFIDENCE is highly significant (p=0.002, one-sided), 
and a Sobel test confirms a significant reduction in the effect of TIME DELAY 
(p<0.008, one-sided). If PREFERENCE STRENGTH is used as the outcome variable, 
                                                 
24
 PREFERENCE STRENGTH is intended to provide an alternative and more sensitive measure of 
participants’ preferences than the dichotomous choice. 
25
 Inferences are unchanged if I do not control for participants’ Period 1 score. 
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a Sobel test again indicates the mediation is significant (p=0.008, one-sided). 
Inferences are similar if I instead use FORECAST OPTIMISM as a measure of 
participants’ optimism. When both TIME DELAY and FORECAST OPTIMISM are 
included in a logistic regression with EM DECISION as the outcome variable, TIME 
DELAY is not significant (p=0.445, two-sided), FORECAST OPTIMISM is significant 
(p=0.002, one-sided), and a Sobel test confirms that the mediation is significant 
(p=0.025, one-sided). Mediation remains significant if PREFERENCE STRENGTH is 
used as the outcome variable (Sobel p=0.026, one-sided). 
These findings provide additional support for the theoretical predictions 
outlined in Figure 1, as participants are more optimistic about future performance 
when there is a significant time delay between periods. I also find that the resulting 
optimism mediates the effect of the time delay manipulation on participants’ 
willingness to trade 5 easy questions for 5 medium questions, which is analogous to 
engaging in real earnings management that increases the difficulty of the environment 
and decreases expected earnings in future periods. In addition, the lack of significance 
of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION after controlling for my measures of optimism 
provides no indication of an incremental effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION by 
directly changing participants’ preferences (e.g., rational or irrational discounting of 
future payoffs, wishful betting, etc.). 
  
32 
TABLE 3 
Experiment 2: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median] 
        
     
  
Full Sample 
 
Participants Who Completed Both Session 1 and 2 
        
     
Variable   Overall   No Delay   Delay  Overall   No Delay   Delay 
       
      
Period 1 Score (out of 25)  
16.830 
 
17.087 = 16.573  17.326  17.800 > 16.904
*
 
 
(3.977) 
 
(3.881) 
 
(4.074)  (3.149)  (2.807)  (3.388) 
 
[18.0] 
 
[18.0] 
 
[18.0]  [18.0]  [18.0]  [18.0] 
       
      
Confidence in Period 2 
Performance relative to 
Period 1
†
 
 
7.413 
 
6.738 < 8.087
***
  7.348  6.492 < 8.110
***
 
 
(2.393) 
 
(2.240) 
 
(2.360)  (2.472)  (2.258)  (2.418) 
 
[8.0] 
 
[7.0] 
 
[8.0]  [8.0]  [6.0]  [8.0] 
       
      
Forecasted Period 2 Score 
(out of 25)
†
 
 
15.956 
 
15.592 < 16.320
*
  16.181  15.846 = 16.479 
 
(4.026) 
 
(4.143) 
 
(3.891)  (3.754)  (3.675)  (3.823) 
 
[17.0] 
 
[16.0] 
 
[17.0]  [17.0]  [15.0]  [17.0] 
       
      
Proportion of Participants 
Engaging in Accruals 
Management
†
 
 
0.592 
 
0.553 = 0.631  0.630  0.554 < 0.699
**
 
             
Preference Strength
†
 
 6.029  5.767 < 6.291
*
  6.254  5.723 < 6.726
**
 
 (2.719)  (2.808)  (2.614)  (2.680)  (2.815)  (2.479) 
 [7.0]  [7.0]  [7.0]  [7.0]  [7.0]  [8.0] 
       
      
Period 2 Score (out of 25)
 †
  
N/A  12.087  N/A  11.514  12.569 < 10.575
***
 
   (3.747)    (3.713)  (3.791)  (3.674) 
   [13.0]    [12.0]  [13.0]  [11.0] 
       
      
  
n = 206 
 
n = 103 
 
n = 103  n = 138  n = 65  n = 73 
This table provides descriptive statistics for various measures captured in Experiment 2, separately presenting variable Means, (Standard Deviations) and 
[Medians] for the No Delay and Delay conditions. 
Significance levels are indicated by ***, **, and * representing significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
†
 One-tailed test. 
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TABLE 4 
Experiment 2: Tests of Horizon-Induced Optimism and Implications for Real Earnings 
Management 
Panel A: Test of H1 
     Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on CONFIDENCE       
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
6.435 0.730 8.82 <0.001 
TIME DELAY + 1.359 0.322 4.22 <0.001
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE   0.018 0.041 0.44 0.663 
      Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on FORECAST OPTIMISM     
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
t-ratio p-value 
Intercept 
 
6.842 0.934 7.33 <0.001 
TIME DELAY + 1.082 0.412 2.63 0.005
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE  -0.312 0.052 -6.01 <0.001 
 
Panel B: Tests of H2b 
     Test of the effect of CONFIDENCE on EM DECISION       
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Chi 
Square 
p-value 
Intercept 
 
-2.667 0.825 10.46 0.001 
TIME DELAY 
 
0.139 0.308 0.20 0.651 
CONFIDENCE + 0.19 0.066 8.38 0.002
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE 
 
0.094 0.038 6.03 0.014 
For log odds of Manage/Don't Manage         
      Test of the effect of FORECAST OPTIMISM on EM DECISION     
Term 
Expectation Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
Chi 
Square 
p-value 
Intercept 
 
-2.512 0.797 9.93 0.002 
TIME DELAY 
 
0.230 0.301 0.58 0.445 
FORECAST OPTIMISM + 0.155 0.053 8.59 0.002
†
 
PERIOD 1 SCORE  0.146 0.043 11.71 <0.001 
For log odds of Manage/Don't Manage         
(continued) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Experiment 2: Tests of Horizon-induced Optimism and Implications for Real Earnings 
Management 
Tests of Mediation      
Description       
Sobel 
Statistic p-value 
Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION 
through CONFIDENCE  
2.39 0.008
†
 
Test of the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION 
through FORECAST OPTIMISM   
1.96 0.025
†
 
      VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: 
CONFIDENCE = participants' response to the following: "how confident are you that you will 
perform at least as well as you did on the first set of questions?" Response is measured on an 
11-point scale, where 1 = "Not at all Confident" and 11 = "Very Confident" 
EM DECISION = Participants are coded as having managed earnings if they elect to borrow 
correct responses from the second period in an attempt to achieve both a first- and second-
period bonus. 
FORECAST OPTIMISM = Forecast - Period 2 Benchmark. Period 2 Benchmark = Period 1 
Score - 3 
TIME DELAY = 1 if a participant was in the Delay condition and 0 otherwise. 
PERIOD 1 SCORE = Number of correct responses (out of 25) in the first set of 25 trivia 
questions. 
This table summarizes tests of my hypotheses. The variable(s) of interest for hypotheses are indicated 
with directional predictions shown under the "Expectation" heading in each panel. 
† One-tailed test. 
 
4.2.2 Ex Post Optimism. Testing whether participants in the Delay condition 
issue more optimistic forecasts relative to their actual performance (EX POST 
OPTIMISM) is problematic in Experiment 2 because participants’ EM DECISION 
affects EX POST OPTIMISM by changing the mix of question difficulty in Period 2.
26
 
However, consistent with TIME DELAY leading participants to overestimate their 
performance in Period 2, participants in the Delay condition simultaneously issue 
                                                 
26
 Participants in the Delay condition exhibit more EX POST OPTIMISM than participants in the No 
Delay condition (p < 0.001, one-sided), but the effect of EM DECISION on EX POST OPTIMISM likely 
contributes to this effect. The result is robust to controlling for EM DECISION (p = 0.002, one-sided), 
but this p-value is potentially biased as a result of the simultaneity between EX POST OPTIMISM and 
EM DECISION. This simultaneity is also likely to bias the results of a formal mediation analysis. 
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higher forecasts (p = 0.005, one-sided) and have lower Period 2 scores (p =  0.003, 
one-sided) than participants in the No Delay condition. This latter effect appears to be 
driven by participants in the Delay condition who engage in real earnings 
management, as they perform significantly worse in Period 2 than participants in the 
No Delay condition who engage in earnings management (p = 0.014, one-sided). For 
participants who do not engage in real earnings management, the effect of TIME 
DELAY on Period 2 performance is not significant (p = 0.458, two-sided). Finally, I 
find that participants in the Delay condition earn lower performance-based bonuses 
than participants in the No Delay condition (p = 0.088, one-sided). These results 
suggest that the time delay increases participants’ willingness to sacrifice future 
performance to qualify for a Period 1 bonus, which is analogous to real earnings 
management.
27
 
4.2.3 Plans to Improve during the Intervening Month. I again find no evidence 
to support the idea that the horizon-induced optimism results from participants in the 
Delay condition expecting to prepare for the Period 2 trivia questions in the 
intervening month. 71.8% of participants indicate that they would perform the same 
regardless of whether they were to complete Period 2 “just a few minutes from now” 
or “next month,” and this is significantly greater than chance (p<0.001, one-sided). 
18.0% of participants indicate they would perform better “just a few minutes from 
now,” whereas only 10.2% of participants indicate they would perform better “next 
month.” Thus, nearly 90% of participants indicate that delaying the Period 2 until the 
                                                 
27
 I again find no evidence that TIME DELAY affects participants’ decision to participate in the second 
experimental session (p = 0.237, two-sided). Participants are more likely to participate in the Session 2 
when they have higher Period 1 scores (p = 0.008, two-sided), but this selection effect does not differ 
across Time Delay conditions (p = 0.333, two-sided). 
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following month would not improve their expected performance, and all inferences are 
unchanged if I base analyses on only these participants. These findings suggest that 
participants do not intentionally exhibit horizon-induced optimism because they 
expect to improve their performance by preparing or practicing for Period 2.
28
                                                 
28
 Participants in the Delay condition indicate that the reduced time limit will affect their performance 
less than participants in the No Delay condition (p < 0.001, one-sided), and this result holds for 
participants who engage in real earnings management (p = 0.002, one-sided) and participants who do 
not engage in real earnings management (p = 0.0529, one-sided). Inferences are unchanged when I 
control for these ratings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 The Direct Effect 
The causal model depicted in Figure 1 suggests that TIME DELAY will affect 
EM DECISION through participants’ optimism, so my primary analyses focus on this 
indirect effect. Early mediation analyses recommended a four-step approach, 
beginning with a test of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). Contemporary methodologists generally advise 
against this approach, especially when there is no hypothesized direct effect or when 
using low-powered tests such as logistic regression that can prevent detection of 
interesting effects (e.g., MacKinnon 2007; MacKinnon et al. 2007).
29
 As indicated on 
Tables 1 and 3, the full sample provides mixed evidence of an effect of time delay on 
earnings management, with the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION being 
marginally significant in Experiment 1 (p = 0.098, one-sided) and failing to meet 
conventional levels of significance in Experiment 2 (p = 0.161, one-sided). Two 
findings suggest this is the result of a low-powered test (as opposed to the lack of an 
effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION). 
First, in order to increase the power of the test, I combine my data from 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and control for experiment.
30
 I find that TIME DELAY 
                                                 
29
 Indeed, on his website, David Kenny explicitly recommends against directly computing the direct 
effect when using logistic regression, suggesting that the total effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable should be inferred (http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm). 
30
 Controlling for experiment jointly controls for any differences between the type of earnings 
management decision (accruals vs. real) and any potential differences in the participant pool 
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significantly increases participants’ propensity to engage in earnings management (p = 
0.044, one-sided), and this effect does not vary by experiment (p = 0.894, two-sided). 
Second, an alternative way to increase power is to decrease noise. Some participants 
might not have actually planned on returning to complete Session 2. These 
participants would be indifferent between managing and not managing earnings 
because they will not qualify for any performance-based bonuses, so their responses 
are likely to add noise. As indicated in Tables 1 and 3, after excluding participants 
who did not return for Session 2, the effect of TIME DELAY on EM DECISION is 
significant for Experiment 1 (p = 0.035, one-sided) and Experiment 2  (p = 0.022, one-
sided). Together, these findings provide additional support for the causal model 
depicted in Figure 1. 
5.2 Compensation 
 Earnings management is presumably costly, as managers might face several 
adverse consequences (e.g., job loss, reputational damage, etc.) if they are unable to 
compensate for current-period earnings management through strong future 
performance. Similarly, I design the incentive structure such that engaging in earnings 
management is costly if Period 2 performance is not sufficient to compensate for the 
earnings management. As indicated previously, participants in the Delay condition 
earn less than participants in the No Delay condition, though this result is only 
marginally significant, even though they face identical compensation structures. After 
combining data across experiments, this effect is significant (p = 0.035, one-sided).
31
 
                                                                                                                                            
(participants were drawn from the same population within several days of each other, but participants 
were not randomly assigned across experiments). 
31
 This effect does not vary across experiment (p = 0.959, two-sided). 
 39 
In addition, I find that this effect is mediated by participants’ EM DECISION (p = 
0.077, one-sided). These results are consistent with horizon-induced optimism leading 
participants in the Delay condition to engage in costly earnings management, 
5.3 Innate Optimism 
 Recent work in behavioral finance and accounting examines how optimism 
affects managerial decisions, but most of this work focuses on optimism as a stable 
individual trait. In contrast, the differences I observe across conditions cannot be 
attributed solely to differences in participants’ innate optimism. Unlike stable-trait 
optimism, horizon-induced optimism is unlikely to be attenuated by screening out 
optimistic individuals unless more optimistic individuals are more likely to exhibit 
horizon-induced optimism. To test this possibility, I invited participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2 to complete a follow-up survey. 117 participants completed 
Scheier, Carver, and Bridges’ (1994) LOT-R, a measure of innate measure. 32, 33 I find 
no evidence that individuals with higher stable-trait optimism are more susceptible to 
horizon-induced optimism. Instead, the results are directionally consistent with the 
idea that the effect of TIME DELAY on CONFIDENCE and FORECAST OPTIMISM 
is decreasing in stable-trait optimism (p = 0.254, two-sided and p = 0.113, two-sided, 
respectively). These findings provide weak evidence that less optimistic individuals 
might be more likely to exhibit horizon-induced optimism than more optimistic 
individuals. However, these findings provide relatively strong evidence that screening 
                                                 
32
 I find no evidence that Time Delay affects participants’ propensity to complete this follow-up survey 
(p = 0.573, two-sided). In addition, while CONFIDENCE and FORECAST OPTIMSIM affect 
participants’ propensity to complete this follow-up survey (p = 0.050, two-sided and p = 0.070, two-
sided, respectively), these self-selection effects do not interact with Time Delay (p = 0.215, two-sided 
and p = 0.528, two-sided, respectively).  
33
 This measure asks participants to indicate their agreement with statements such as, “I’m always 
optimistic about my future” (see also, Libby and Rennekamp 2011; Hales et al. 2012). 
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managers based on measures of innate optimism is unlikely to be an effective 
intervention for horizon-induced optimism. 
5.4 Measures of Optimism 
My primary analyses rely on two measures of participants’ optimism – 
CONFIDENCE and FORECAST OPTIMISM. When both measures are included with 
TIME DELAY as predictors of EM DECISION, I find that CONFIDENCE and 
FORECAST OPTIMISM both remain significant for Experiment 1 (p = 0.027, one-
sided and p < 0.001, one-sided, respectively) and for Experiment 2 (p = 0.073, one-
sided and p = 0.052, one-sided, respectively). While these two measures of optimism 
are correlated (ρ = 0.559 and ρ = 0.551 in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively), it’s 
possible these two measures are capturing slightly different facets of optimism 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.651 and 0.690 in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). For 
example, CONFIDENCE might capture a general sense of participants’ optimism 
while FORECAST OPTIMISM might capture a more deliberative and calculative 
measure of participants’ optimism. Importantly, however, my time delay manipulation 
significantly affects both measures of optimism, suggesting that horizon-induced 
optimism is likely to affect behavior that is influenced by either or both facets of 
optimism.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION  
I use two experiments to examine how the amount of time between the current 
period and the period when the earnings management reversal occurs affects optimism 
and earnings management, holding constant participants’ incentives, participants’ 
innate optimism, and the information environment. My results indicate that optimism 
about future performance is increasing in the length of this time delay, and this 
horizon-induced optimism increases participants’ propensity to engage in behavior 
that is analogous to accruals-based and real earnings management. 
My findings extend prior work by providing evidence that a fundamental 
feature of the earnings management setting can systematically induce optimism and 
increase earnings management, even holding constant factors to which earnings 
management has previously been attributed (e.g., agency frictions, capital market 
pressure, and innate optimism). My findings also indicate that optimism is most likely 
to be important in settings where there is a significant amount of time between the 
decision and the realization of its outcome. Consistent with this idea, prior work finds 
that management forecast optimism is increasing in the forecast horizon (Choi and 
Ziebart 2004; Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman 2008), although these authors 
attribute this result to management incentives to intentionally bias their forecasts. My 
results suggest that the amount of time between the forecast and the outcome might 
contribute to this pattern of forecast optimism, even absent these strategic reporting 
incentives. 
 42 
 My findings might also have implications for the debate on reporting 
frequency, and future work might examine how the effect of horizon-induced 
optimism on earnings management depends on reporting frequency. Because the 
length of the time delay to the next period is decreasing in reporting frequency, one 
possibility is that horizon-induced optimism could work against myopic behavior as 
reporting frequency increases. However, another possibility is that horizon-induced 
optimism could exacerbate myopic behavior as reporting frequency increases, because 
the number of time delays between periods is increasing in reporting frequency. 
The primary limitation of my study is my inability to assess the magnitude of 
the effect of horizon-induced optimism on either managers’ beliefs or earnings 
management behavior in the real world. However, there is reason to expect that 
managers would be susceptible to these same errors given the neural mechanisms 
underlying optimism. In addition, optimism appears to affect various managerial 
decisions, suggesting that optimism is not fully disciplined by the strong incentives 
and institutional forces in these settings. The incentive structure in my experiment is 
designed to capture several important aspects of managers’ incentives to manage 
earnings with the expectation of compensating for that behavior through strong future 
performance. The examination of other features of the reporting environment not 
captured in my study provides a potential avenue for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
Panel A. Accruals Management Proxy (Experiment 1) 
You can earn a second round bonus of $0.50 if you correctly answer at least [Period 1 
Score – 3] questions in the second round. However, if you're willing to borrow 4 
correct responses from the second round to add to your first round score, you can earn 
a first round bonus of $0.50 in addition to the second round bonus of $0.50. If you 
choose this option, you would have to correctly answer at least [Period 1 Score + 1] 
questions in the second round in order to keep this first round bonus and earn the 
second round bonus. 
Please choose the bonus option you believe is most favorable to you: 
 Option 1: If you answer at least [Period 1 Score – 3] questions correctly on the 
second round, receive a $0.50 second round bonus. 
 Option 2: If you answer at least [Period 1 Score + 1] questions correctly on 
the second round, receive a $0.50 first round bonus and a $0.50 second round 
bonus. 
 
Panel B. Real Earnings Management Proxy (Experiment 2) 
You can earn a second round bonus of $0.50 if you correctly answer at least [Period 1 
Score – 3] questions in the second round. However, if you're willing to trade five easy 
questions for five medium questions on the second round, you can earn a first round 
bonus of $0.50 in addition to the second round bonus of $0.50. If you choose this 
option, you would have to correctly answer at least [Period 1 Score – 3] questions in 
the second round with 10 easy, 10 medium, and 5 hard questions in order to keep 
this first round bonus and earn the second round bonus. 
Please choose the bonus option you believe is most favorable to you: 
 Option 1: If you answer at least [Period 1 Score – 3] questions correctly on the 
second round with 15 easy, 5 medium, and 5 hard questions, receive a $0.50 
second round bonus. 
 Option 2: If you answer at least [Period 1 Score – 3] questions correctly on the 
second round with 10 easy, 10 medium, and 5 hard questions, receive a 
$0.50 first round bonus and a $0.50 second round bonus.
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